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INTRODUCTION 
In a world of proliferating and expanding legal systems, and of 
increasing recourse to judicial–type dispute settlement, the concept of 
a “dialogue” between courts has long been central to debates about 
their interaction and interdependency. The concept has its origins in 
the very construction of the EU legal system, which required 
mechanisms for ensuring that Member State courts interacted with the 
EU Court of Justice (“CJEU”), and could be enlisted as agents for the 
enforcement of EU law.1 One of those mechanisms is the preliminary 
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rulings system, which instituted a formal dialogue between the CJEU 
and national courts. But, there has also been a dialogue outside the 
framework of that system; for example, between the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (“BVerfG”) and the CJEU.2 It could even 
be argued that at the grand constitutional level, the non–formal 
dialogue has been more influential than the preliminary rulings 
mechanism. That is certainly the case regarding the EU system of 
fundamental rights protection, which is the product of the pressure 
exercised by the German and Italian constitutional courts.3 It is the 
BVerfG which has introduced the Solange criterion, a Janus–like 
concept which serves as a gatekeeper for ensuring that, where a legal 
system opens itself up to another system, its fundamental principles—
in particular the protection of fundamental rights—are safeguarded.4 
This is an idea which has caught on. The European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) has employed it in its Bosphorus decision, which 
accepted the EU system of fundamental rights protection as 
equivalent to its own.5 The CJEU has referred to it in Kadi I, even if 
in the negative sense of not accepting the adequacy of fundamental 
rights protection by the UN Security Council when listing supporters 
of terrorism.6 It must be added that there is no agreement between 
commentators on whether Kadi I incorporates a true Solange 
principle: some have read the judgment as saying that the CJEU 
would never defer to a UN system of rights protection, even if it 
offered full protection.7 
The Kadi litigation shows that there is also scope for dialogue 
between the CJEU and international courts and tribunals, even if no 
such court or tribunal was involved in that particular case. Indeed, the 
ECtHR is an international court, both from an external public 
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Gauweiler and Others, Opinion of Cruz Villalón AG, EU:C:2015:7. 
3. Gráinne de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 465 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2d ed., OUP 2011). 
4. BVerfG, Solange I [1974] CMLR 540 and Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) 
[1987] CMLR 225. 
5. Bosphorus v. Ireland, App No. 45036/98 (2006) 42 EHRR 1. 
6. Joined Cases C–402 and 415/05 Kadi v. Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, ¶¶ 
319–25. 
7. See JHH Weiler, Editorial, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 895 (2008); see also D. Halberstam & 
E. Stein, The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic 
Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 13, 59–
61 (2009). 
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international law perspective, and in terms of its self–perception.8 It 
has for a long time entertained a dialogue with the CJEU,9 through 
case law as well as other forms of communication, which at one point 
even led to a joint press release.10 The CJEU has further been 
confronted with matters of WTO law, including WTO case law. 
Although the Court does not recognise the direct effect of WTO 
law,11 or of WTO case law,12 there have been veiled references to 
such case law, leading one commentator to coin the concept of a 
“muted dialogue.”13 
It is clear that judicial dialogue is an essentially contested 
concept.14 Its scope and meaning are a function of how one theorises 
the relationships between different legal systems. The current 
predominant theory is legal or constitutional pluralism, but it is fair to 
say that there are many different pluralism versions,15 some of which 
may even be seen to be conflicting. Moreover, pluralism is itself 
contested, and I have argued in an earlier paper that, at least in the 
sphere of the relationship between the EU, ECHR, and national 
constitutional systems of human rights protection, the paradigm of 
legal integration is more appropriate than that of legal pluralism.16 
That paper also looked at the EU’s accession to the ECHR, 
mandated by Article 6(2) of the Treaty of the European Union 
(“TEU”). The CJEU has now delivered a negative Opinion on the 
compatibility of the draft Accession Agreement with the EU 
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Treaties—notwithstanding the imperative nature of accession.17 It is a 
hugely significant Opinion, not just in relation to the specific issues 
raised by the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
accession, but equally regarding the Court’s conception of the 
autonomy of EU law, which impacts the kind of relationship the 
Court is willing to entertain with other courts and tribunals. It follows 
in the footsteps of earlier rulings emphasising the need to safeguard 
the autonomy of EU law in relation to the possible roles played by 
such non–EU courts and tribunals in the interpretation and application 
of EU law.18 This application of the autonomy concept is linked to the 
Solange principle, and to the issue of judicial dialogue. The Court 
employs the concept to ensure that the “specific characteristics” of 
EU law (to use the terms of Protocol 8 on ECHR accession) are not 
undermined by the EU’s participation in international dispute 
settlement. The EU can only open itself up to international dispute 
settlement and to the creation of new courts or tribunals if the 
fundamental characteristics of EU law are preserved. The CJEU’s 
own jurisdiction is one of those characteristics. 
Opinion 2/13 has so far not been well received—with a couple 
of exceptions.19 This Essay joins the chorus of criticism, but also aims 
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18. Opinion 1/76 re Inland Waterways EU:C:1977:63; Opinion 1/91 re EEA Agreement 
EU:C:1991:490; Opinion 1/00 re European Common Aviation Area EU:C:2002:231; 
Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), Case C–459/03, EU:C:2006:345; Opinion 1/09 re 
Unified Patent Litigation System EU:C:2011:123. 
19. See e.g., Steve Peers, The CJEU and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: A Clear and 
Present Danger to Human Rights Protection, EU L. ANALYSIS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html; Leonard F.M. 
Besselink, Acceding to the ECHR notwithstanding the Court of Justice Opinion 2/13, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/acceding-echr-
notwithstanding-court-justice-opinion-213/; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR: A Christmas Bombshell From the European Court of Justice, [UK 
Constitutional Law Association] (Dec. 24, 2014), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/12/24/
sionaidh-douglas-scott-opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-the-echr-a-christmas-bombshell-from-
the-european-court-of-justice/; Pieter Jan Kuijper, Reaction to Leonard Besselink’s ACELG 
Blog, BLOGACTIV (Jan. 6, 2015), http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-
besselinks’s-acelg-blog/; Stian Øby Johansen, The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in 
Opinion 2/13 and its Potential Consequences, 16 GERMAN L. J. 169 (2015); Adam Lazowski 
& Ramses A. Wessel, When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the 
European Union to the ECHR, 16 GERMAN L. J. 179 (2015); Steve Peers, The EU's Accession 
to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare, 16 GERMAN L. J. 213 (2015); Editorial 
Comments: The EU's Accession to the ECHR - A ‘NO’ from the ECJ!, 52 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1 (2015). But see Daniel Halberstam, ‘It's the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of 
Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, 16 GERMAN L. 
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to deepen some of the analysis, as well as focusing it on wider 
questions of judicial dialogue and autonomy. Where relevant for the 
purpose of its critique, the Essay also refers to the View of Advocate 
General Kokott, which is generally much more positive in tone—even 
if it also finds fault with some of the provisions of the Accession 
Agreement.20 It starts with an attempt to give some basic meaning to 
the dialogue concept, on which it may be possible to find some 
agreement. The argument is that, at a minimum, the ECtHR should be 
able to exercise its core function of controlling compliance with the 
Convention norms, which are within their jurisdiction. It then 
examines the CJEU’s approach towards the Accession Agreement, 
arguing that it fails to respect that core function. The Essay goes on to 
consider the case “for the defense,” and in favour of the current status 
quo, but finds that case to be unconvincing. 
I. DIALOGUE AND AUTONOMY 
It is not the purpose of this Essay to develop a full 
conceptualization of judicial dialogue and of the requisite autonomy 
of EU law. Regarding dialogue with international courts and 
tribunals—including the ECtHR—there are different views on how 
the EU and public international law legal systems interact, and on 
how they ought to interact. There is, to begin with, a fundamental 
discord between “EU lawyers” and “international lawyers,” well 
described by Bruno de Witte21: the former conceive of EU law as a 
sui generis constitutional–type system which has been severed from 
its international law origins; the latter argue that EU law is no more 
than a regional subsystem of international law. Within public 
international law itself there are divergent views on fragmentation, 
with arguments about whether there continues to be a unitary system, 
or whether at least some of its subsystems have gained independence 
by having become self–contained.22 Fragmentation gives rise to 
questions which are similar to those looked at by the pluralism 
                                                                                                                                     
J. 105 (2015); C. Krenn, Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR 
Accession After Opinion 2/13, 16 GERMAN L. J. 147 (2015). 
20. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Opinion 2/13 EC:C:2014:2475 [hereinafter 
Kokott Opinion]. 
21. Bruno de Witte, European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Order?, 65 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 141, 146 (2010). 
22. Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self–contained 
Regimes in International Law, 17 EJIL 483 (2006). 
6 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1 
literature.23 Further, there is disagreement on the degree of openness 
of EU law towards international law, particularly, but by no means 
exclusively, as a result of the Kadi litigation.24 In this respect the 
debate focuses on the rich case law of the CJEU on the direct and 
other effects of international agreements, and on whether international 
norms can be relied upon for purposes of EU judicial review—or 
indeed whether they may preclude such review (Kadi I). 
So is it possible to say anything useful about the concept of 
dialogue between international courts and the CJEU, for the purpose 
of an analysis and critique of Opinion 2/13, without first resolving the 
above disagreements? An attempt at finding some agreed (in the sense 
of agreeable) meaning could run as follows. 
In the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR no 
questions arise as to the degree of integration of ECHR norms into 
EU law. Indeed, the CJEU has for a long time used the Convention as 
one of the main sources for determining what fundamental rights form 
part of the general principles of EU law. Notwithstanding initial 
doubts expressed by some,25 it has attempted to respect the 
Convention, as well as the ECtHR case law.26 The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (“EUCFR”) effectively incorporates the 
Convention norms into EU law, and contains strict instructions for 
EU law to respect the Convention.27 So the Convention rights are 
already fully integrated in EU law, albeit not in a formal sense. 
However, as the CJEU points out and accepts in Opinion 2/13, 
accession would have the effect of formally incorporating the 
Convention into the EU legal order,28 of making it an integral part of 
that legal order,29 and of subjecting the EU institutions, including the 
Court, to the decisions and judgments of the ECtHR, which would be 
binding.30 The CJEU does not go so far as saying that the Convention 
                                                            
23. Regarding the question of whether WTO panels should apply non-WTO international 
norms, see generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2003). 
24. See supra note 6. See generally Commission and Others v. Kadi, Case C–584/10 P, 
EU:C:2013:518. 
25. Jason Coppell and Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights 
Seriously?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 669, 689 (1992). 
26. See supra note 9. 
27. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 52(3) 2000 O.J. C 364/01. 
28. See ECHR Accession, supra note 17, ¶ 179. 
29. Id. ¶ 180. 
30. Id. ¶ 181–82. 
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norms will have direct effect in EU law, but it is difficult to see on 
what basis such effect could be denied, given that the Convention is 
inherently about the rights and freedoms of private parties.31 
In light of these elements, accession is about subjecting the EU 
and its institutions to external control by the ECtHR, as to respect for 
Convention rights. The CJEU accepts this in principle, but considers 
that the particular arrangements for accession, as contained in the 
Accession Agreement, undermine, in essence, the autonomy of EU 
law. Now it is clear that the ECtHR will not be able to exercise its 
control function without entering into some kind of judicial dialogue 
with the CJEU about possible violations of the Convention and ways 
to remedy them. From the perspective of ensuring that this control 
function can be performed, it is possible to give some basic meaning 
to the dialogue concept. A judicial dialogue which is part of a 
mechanism of ensuring that the institutions of a particular legal 
system—including its courts—respect external norms which are 
interpreted and applied by an external court must clearly include the 
ability for that external court to “look into” that legal system. The 
external court must be in a position to examine that legal system, for 
else it will be unable to exercise control. This means that the court 
must be able, in its judgments, to make statements on how it 
understands that legal system to operate, so as to rule on defects and 
compliance. Applied to the ECHR–EU relationship, the ECtHR must 
be able to look into EU law, and to make statements about how it 
understands that law to function, in order to exercise its control 
function.  
This of course is but one part of the judicial dialogue, for else it 
would be a monologue. The courts of the legal system which has 
accepted external control must also be in a position to make 
statements about how that system conceives of the external norms 
with which it needs to comply, and what mechanisms for compliance 
their system makes use of. Again applied to the ECHR–EU 
relationship, the external control by the ECtHR will work better if the 
CJEU is in a position to construe the Convention, and analyse in its 
case law in what ways the EU ensures respect for the Convention. 
That part of the dialogue, however, is less relevant to this Essay’s 
analysis, for two reasons. First, the Accession Agreement introduces 
the (in)famous prior involvement mechanism, which is created so as 
                                                            
31. Cf. Intertanko, Case C–308/06, EU:C:2008:312, ¶ 59, 64. 
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to enable the CJEU to intervene in those cases pending before the 
ECtHR in which it has not yet had the opportunity to rule on the 
relevant EU law issues. It is the CJEU itself that has insisted on this 
mechanism. Second, it is accepted and acquired that the CJEU is 
generally capable of construing the Convention, as its norms form 
part of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It would be in an even 
stronger position to do so after accession, because the ECHR 
provisions will then be an integral part of EU law. 
The question which this Essay seeks to answer is whether, in the 
conditions for accession which it imposes, Opinion 2/13 allows for 
this basic concept of judicial dialogue. More specifically, would it 
still be possible for the ECtHR to perform its control function—or, 
put differently, to exercise the specific judicial function for which it 
was created, which is of course mainly to consider individual 
complaints about human rights violations and to ensure that the 
Convention is respected throughout Europe. This requires an analysis 
of whether the conditions for accession are so strict as to undermine 
the proper exercise of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction and of its control 
function. 
It also requires an analysis of whether the ECtHR would be 
given sufficient leeway to look into the EU legal system, for the 
purpose of determining when and how the Convention may be 
violated. No proper dialogue between the two courts on the EU’s 
compliance with the Convention can take place if the ECtHR is 
precluded from considering all relevant matters of EU law, because of 
the conditions for accession which are imposed as a result of Opinion 
2/13. There is, as we will see, an EU–specific dimension to that 
requirement for a proper judicial dialogue: it is the fact that EU law is 
as a rule implemented by the EU Member States, through their 
national laws, and that this requires decisions on the attribution of 
responsibility, to either the EU or the implementing Member State, or 
to both. 
Next to these conditions for proper judicial dialogue, what could 
be a basic understanding of preserving the autonomy of EU law—a 
particular focus of Opinion 2/13? As will be seen, the CJEU is mostly 
concerned with safeguarding its own jurisdiction. That is not 
necessarily an invalid concern.32 As described above, the very 
phenomenon of judicial dialogue across European legal systems 
                                                            
32. See Halberstam, supra note 10.  
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started with the introduction of the Solange concept by the BVerfG. 
That concept demands that dialogue does not undermine the 
fundamental principles of the legal system which opens itself up, or 
which “integrates” the norms of another system. This means that it is 
part of a basic understanding of judicial dialogue for the CJEU to 
require respect for the fundamental characteristics of EU law—for its 
autonomy. It is definitely acceptable, as a matter of principle, for 
those characteristics to include the essential elements of the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction. Genuine judicial dialogue should not lead to subverting 
the function and jurisdiction of either of the judicial actors, which 
engage in it.33 What will need to be examined, though, is whether the 
CJEU operates a proper understanding of what those fundamental 
characteristics are—including the question whether that 
understanding is not so restrictive as to preclude a genuine judicial 
dialogue. 
It is also important to emphasise that the principles and 
conditions which the CJEU established or confirmed in Opinion 2/13 
transcend the specific question of the EU’s accession to the 
Convention. In a world in which (a) the EU is becoming an ever more 
active international treaty–maker, and (b) international law is 
characterised by a growing judicialisation,34 the Opinion will be a 
touchstone for many other instances of potential judicial dialogue 
between the CJEU and international courts. 
In what follows, this Essay examines different aspects of 
Opinion 2/13, against the benchmark of the above basic ideas of what 
proper judicial dialogue and autonomy require. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S OBJECTIONS 
A. The EU Charter’s Level of Protection 
In a first section the Court looks rather generally at what it calls 
“the specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law.”35 It starts 
by recalling the effects of accession, which are to make the ECtHR 
formally binding on the EU and its institutions. It also reiterates that 
                                                            
33. Contra R. Krämer & J. Märten, Der Dialog der Gerichte – die Fortentwicklung des 
Persönlichkeitsschutzes im europäischen Mehrebenenrechtsverbund, EUROPARECHT 
(forthcoming 2015). 
34. See generally, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Karen 
Alter, Cesare Romano & Yuval Shany eds., 2014). 
35. See ECHR Accession, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 179–200. 
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the EU must be able to conclude “an international agreement 
providing for the creation of a court responsible for the interpretation 
of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the institutions, 
including the Court of Justice.”36 However, the essential character of 
the Court’s own powers must be safeguarded, and the autonomy of 
the EU legal order must not be adversely affected. In particular, the 
Court adds, “any action by the bodies given decision–making powers 
by the ECHR . . . must not have the effect of binding the EU and its 
institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular 
interpretation of the rules of EU law.”37 
These statements can be regarded as uncontroversial from the 
perspectives of dialogue and autonomy, except for the last one. 
Throughout the Opinion, the Court emphasises that accession will 
make the Convention an integral part of EU law. Moreover, the 
Convention norms form part of the EU Charter, which emphasises in 
Article 52(3) that the meaning and scope of the relevant Charter 
provisions must be the same as those of the Convention. So does the 
last statement mean that the Convention interpretations by the ECtHR 
are in no sense binding on the Court of Justice, which must for 
example be free to adopt its own interpretation of a Charter right that 
replicates a Convention right? If that were the case, it would not be 
conducive to a judicial dialogue that enables the ECtHR to exercise 
its control function. It would, moreover, be contradictory to the 
principle that it is possible for the EU to conclude an international 
agreement establishing a court whose decisions are binding on the 
Court of Justice. It is true that the above statement does not clarify 
whether it extends to the actual Convention rights, or is limited to EU 
law other than the Convention. The question is nevertheless anything 
but academic. There has been debate about the extent to which the EU 
should be able to develop its own conception of fundamental rights 
protection, now that it has its own Charter.38 There are moreover signs 
in the case law of a tendency to conceive of international norms as in 
some sense “domesticated,” once incorporated in EU law.39 
Effectively this may mean that those norms need to be interpreted in 
                                                            
36. Id. ¶ 182. 
37. Id. ¶ 184. 
38. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 
Case C–70/10, EU:C:2011:255, ¶ 33. 
39. M. Cremona, paper presented at ESIL in 2014. 
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accordance with the EU’s objectives.40 But if that were the case, also 
as regards the Convention, how could the EU ensure that it complies 
with the Convention, and respects the binding nature of the ECtHR’s 
judgments? 
However, the further analysis, which the Court of Justice then 
offers of the relationship between the Convention and the Charter, is 
more disturbing. The Court emphasises that “it should not be possible 
for the ECtHR to call into question the Court's findings in relation to 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law, for the purposes, in particular, 
of determining whether a Member State is bound by fundamental 
rights of the EU.”41 This is a reference to what I have called the 
“federal question” regarding the Charter: in which cases does it bind 
the Member States, because they are implementing EU law (Article 
51(1) Charter)?42 It is a very sensitive question, which is difficult to 
answer, and the Court has arguably been struggling with it.43 
However, there is no indication at all in either the Convention or the 
Accession Agreement that the ECtHR could be called upon to answer 
this question. Nor does that seem to be the Court of Justice’s main 
concern, as in the following paragraphs it turns to a different 
horizontal provision of the Charter: Article 53, which provides that 
nothing in the Charter is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting fundamental rights as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by EU law and, inter alia, the Convention as well as 
Member States’ constitutions. The Court then refers to its Melloni 
decision, in which it decided that Article 53 Charter does not allow 
the application of a higher standard of constitutional protection in 
cases involving uniform EU legislation, such as the European Arrest 
Warrant (“EAW”): “the application of national standards of 
protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of 
                                                            
40. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Ikea Wholesale, Case C–351/04, 
EU:C:2007:236. 
41. See ECHR Accession, supra note 17, at ¶ 186. 
42. Piet Eeckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 39 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 945 (2002). 
43. Contrast a case such as Case C–617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, in which 
the Court decided that a Swedish criminal tax fraud case was subject to the Charter because it 
partly involved VAT fraud, even if there was no further connection with EU law; with a case 
such as C–40/11 Iida EU:C:2012:691, in which the Court decided that the immigration status 
in Germany of a Japanese citizen, who is the father of an EU citizen who has moved to 
Austria, is not within the scope of EU law. 
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protection provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law.”44 
It is time to pause here for a moment. Not all commentators may 
agree with Melloni, yet it is hard to see in what way the ECtHR could 
threaten this ruling. In Melloni the CJEU decided that the provisions 
of the EAW (on convictions in absentia, but with representation by 
counsel of choice) were in conformity with the Charter. In this regard, 
the ECtHR could do one of two things, if it was ever asked to look 
into this: it could decide that those EAW provisions comply with the 
Convention, or that they do not comply. In the latter case, the EU 
would be found to be in breach of the Convention, and would need to 
amend the EAW legislation. That, it would seem, is precisely the 
purpose of the external control by the ECtHR. Such a case would 
reveal disagreement between the ECtHR and the CJEU on how the 
Convention needs to be interpreted, and one can leave open the 
question of how such disagreement could be resolved. But surely the 
ECtHR could not determine that the abstract Melloni principle, which 
essentially concerns the primacy and uniform application of EU 
legislation, violates the Convention. In fact, Advocate General Kokott 
found that the Accession Agreement does not affect the direct effect 
and primacy of EU law, without even considering the specific Melloni 
issue.45 
So what does the Court have in mind? In the next paragraph it 
clarifies that it is concerned about the potential effect of another 
Article 53: that of the Convention itself. The Court points out that 
Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the 
Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of protection of 
fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the Convention. The 
Court then reveals its main concern, and it is worth quoting it in full:  
[Article 53 of the ECHR] should be coordinated with Article 53 
of the Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so that the 
power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is 
limited—with respect to the rights recognised by the Charter that 
correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR—to that which is 
necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by 
the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law 
are not compromised.46  
                                                            
44.  ECHR Accession, supra note 17, ¶ 188. 
45. See Kokott AG, supra note 20, §§ 197–207. 
46. Id. § 189. 
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In other words, the Court appears to insist on the insertion, into 
the Accession Agreement, of a provision confirming that an EU 
Member State cannot impose a higher standard of protection in a 
Melloni–type situation, which concerns the primacy and uniformity of 
EU legislation. However, is there any real danger that the ECtHR 
would ever force an EU Member State to apply a national standard of 
human rights protection which is higher than the Convention 
standard, where that Member State is bound by the EU standard? The 
ECtHR enforces the Convention, it does not enforce higher national 
standards of protection. It does not act as a protector of the power 
granted to the Contracting Parties to apply higher standards. It seems 
self–evident that there is no basis in the Convention for what would 
effectively amount to a prohibition imposed on the ECHR 
Contracting Parties to bind themselves, by virtue of an international 
agreement (here the EU Treaties), to a standard of fundamental rights 
protection, which complies with, but does not exceed the standard of 
the Convention.47 
The CJEU implicitly adopts a wide notion of potential conflict 
between EU primary law and the Convention, in relation to the two 
Articles 53. It is true that, in theoretical terms, two legal provisions 
can be regarded as conflicting where one of them prohibits conduct 
which the other permits.48 In that sense, the permissive effect of 
Article 53 of the ECHR, which allows Contracting Parties to arrange 
for higher standards of fundamental rights protection, could be seen to 
be undermined by the uniform standard of protection imposed by the 
EU Charter in combination with relevant EU legislation. However, 
such a wide notion of conflict cannot operate as a benchmark for 
reviewing whether an international agreement which the EU intends 
to conclude is compatible with the EU Treaties. It is simply too 
restrictive, in that it would make it virtually impossible for the EU to 
participate in international lawmaking: there will always be examples 
of wide conflicts. Nor has the wide notion been employed by the 
ECtHR as regards review of EU Member State action when 
implementing EU law. The Bosphorus presumption of equivalence, 
founded on the need to accept that ECHR Contracting Parties comply 
with other international obligations, seeks to accommodate the kind of 
                                                            
47. Cf. M. Claes & S. Imamovic, National Courts in the New European Fundamental 
Rights Architecture, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 172 (V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris & V. 
Tzevelekos, eds. 2015); Halberstam, supra note 19, at 125. 
48. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 23, at 164–88. 
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tension there may be between different legal systems from the 
perspective of a wide notion of conflict. 
Lastly, if one looks at this CJEU objection from the perspective 
of dialogue, it seems clear that a proper dialogue between the two 
courts is not facilitated by the proclamation of certain “no–go areas” 
by one of them. Nor does such a proclamation facilitate the ECtHR 
control function. 
B. Autonomy and the EU Principle of Mutual Trust 
In the next section of the Opinion the Court looks at the principle 
of mutual trust (or mutual recognition) between Member States, 
which is in particular a component of the EU’s Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (“AFSJ”).49 The principle means that, save in 
exceptional circumstances, an EU Member State may not be the 
judge, when implementing EU law, of whether another Member State 
complies with its fundamental rights obligations. Mutual trust is 
required in the context of the EAW, for example, and of the EU’s 
asylum legislation, which determines the Member State responsible 
for asylum applications. When implementing those pieces of EU 
legislation a Member State must surrender, and respectively return, 
persons to another Member State without verifying whether that 
Member State complies with human rights. This principle of mutual 
trust has already caused some friction with the Convention. In M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece the ECtHR found that Belgium could not 
return asylum seekers to Greece because of violations of the 
Convention rights of these vulnerable people in Greece.50 In N.S. the 
CJEU subsequently accepted that the systemic nature of these 
violations justified a kind of exception to the principle of mutual trust, 
and was able to construe the asylum regulation in such a way that the 
asylum seekers would not be returned to Greece.51 However, in its 
more recent case law the ECtHR does not confine its intervention to 
systemic violations, but finds that the Convention must be fully 
applied to individual cases.52 The UK Supreme Court has effectively 
                                                            
49. See S. Douglas–Scott, The EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Lack of 
Fundamental Rights, Mutual Trust and Democracy?, 11 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUROP. L. 
STUD. 53 (2008–09). 
50. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ECHR 2011. 
51. Joined Cases C–411/10 and C–493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865. 
52. Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], App. No. 29217/12, ECHR 2014. 
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sided with the ECtHR.53 Opinion 2/13 now clarifies that the Court 
does not particularly appreciate this effect of the Convention. 
The Court’s reasoning is extraordinary, and was not preceded by 
any analysis in the View of Advocate General Kokott, who did not 
even mention the issue.54 The Court blames the Accession Agreement 
for treating the EU as a State and giving it a role identical in every 
respect to that of any other Contracting Party. This approach:  
[S]pecifically disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU and . . . 
fails to take into consideration the fact that the Member States 
have . . . accepted that relations between them as regards the 
matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member 
States to the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU 
law so requires, of any other law.55  
If the ECtHR were to require that an EU Member State checks 
whether another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even 
though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust, accession 
would be “liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and 
undermine the autonomy of EU law.”56 The message is therefore that 
EU law may rightly require the Member States not to check 
Convention violations by another Member State, and that this should 
not be undermined by accession. 
Again the Court’s approach seeks to cordon off parts of EU law 
that would need to be protected from control by the ECtHR. That is 
not a good starting point for a proper judicial dialogue. Nor is it 
consonant with the principle that the purpose of accession is to 
subject the EU to Strasbourg control. There may well be good reasons 
for defending the principle of mutual trust as being generally 
compatible with the Convention, save in specific cases of blatant or 
systemic violations. But it would surely be beneficial, from the 
perspective of fundamental rights protection, for the dialogue between 
the ECtHR and the CJEU about the limitations to the mutual–trust 
principle to continue. Instead, the CJEU requires that the Accession 
Agreement carves out that principle. This could lead to a situation in 
which, effectively, the ECtHR would no longer be able to deliver a 
ruling such as in the M.S.S. case. Accession would be leading to less 
control rather than more. Unfortunately there are more instances of 
                                                            
53. EM (Eritrea) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t [2014] UKSC 12. 
54. See Kokott Opinion, supra note 20. 
55. ECHR Accession, supra note 17, ¶ 193. 
56. Id. ¶ 194. 
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such a reductionist effect in the further conditions, which the Court 
imposed in the Opinion. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the autonomy of EU law, it is 
not clear at all that the principle of mutual trust, as a “specific 
characteristic” of EU law, trumps the protection of fundamental 
rights.57 It is true that the principle is a cornerstone of the AFSJ, and 
that the relevant TFEU provisions make several references to mutual 
recognition. But the protection of fundamental rights is a foundational 
EU value,58 and the TFEU’s opening provision on the AFSJ 
predicates the area on “respect for fundamental rights”59—such 
respect is also a “specific characteristic” of EU law. Surely, that 
means that in the event of a conflict between mutual trust and human 
rights, the latter must prevail, as a matter of EU law? 
It is difficult to see in what way the current (pre–accession) and 
potential future challenges (post–accession) to the principle of mutual 
trust are anything other than a manifestation of the very purpose of 
the incorporation of the Convention norms in the Charter, and of the 
full integration of the Convention coupled with Strasbourg control by 
virtue of the Treaty–mandated accession. There are other areas of EU 
law which may be candidates for future Strasbourg review, such as 
the standing requirements for private parties in actions for 
annulment,60 the position of the Advocate General in CJEU 
proceedings, and the role of the Commission in competition 
investigations, to name but a few. It is difficult to see in what way 
mutual trust is more systemic, in EU law, than those examples. Must 
they also be excluded from ECtHR review in an accession agreement 
which respects the autonomy of EU law? 
A further point in relation to mutual trust is that, from an EU 
perspective, the current interference by the ECtHR is worse than a 
post–accession review.61 As the M.S.S. and Tarakhel judgments show, 
mutual trust is currently not shielded from Strasbourg review, at least 
not where the Member States are able to exercise discretion, such as 
in asylum applications. The Bosphorus equivalence and deference 
                                                            
57. Peers, supra note 19, at 221. 
58. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, art. 2, 2010 O.J. C 
83/01 [hereinafter TEU].  
59. See TFEU, infra note 84, art. 67(1).  
60. See TFEU, infra note 84, art. 263.  
61. See also Halberstam, supra note 19, at 126–37 (developing a very interesting 
argument in support of accession, on the basis that the current system threatens the EU’s 
federal stability). 
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principle does not apply. The effect of this is that, instead of the EU 
being able to defend itself in such cases, the Member States are in the 
dock. This is less likely to lead to a proper defense of the EU 
principle of mutual trust before the ECtHR, and to the determination 
of an acceptable balance with the protection of fundamental rights. It 
may also lead to Member States simply disregarding EU law, on the 
basis that they are required to comply with the Convention. 
C. Protocol 16 
In the third section of the Opinion focusing on the specific 
characteristics and autonomy of EU law, the Court looks at the newly 
minted Protocol 16 to the Convention, which will enable the highest 
courts and tribunals of the Member States to request the ECtHR to 
give advisory opinions on questions of principle. The Court contrasts 
this with the EU law obligation for such highest courts to refer cases 
on EU law to the Court of Justice under the preliminary rulings 
system. The Court recognises that the EU itself will not become a 
party to Protocol 16, and that it was signed after the Accession 
Agreement had been negotiated. Nevertheless, the Court goes on to 
explain, “since the ECHR would form an integral part of EU law, the 
mechanism established by that protocol could—notably where the 
issue concerns rights guaranteed by the Charter corresponding to 
those secured by the ECtHR—affect the autonomy and effectiveness 
of the preliminary rulings procedure.”62 
Reading up to that point, it is difficult to understand the Court’s 
concern. Why would a second European preliminary rulings system 
affect the autonomy and effectiveness of the EU one? Are preliminary 
rulings to be conceived of as some type of EU intellectual property, 
which may not be duplicated? Nor is it easy to see how this concern, 
even if it were justified, has anything to do with the Accession 
Agreement. Protocol 16 has been signed and will or will not enter into 
force, independently of EU accession to the Convention. If Member 
States’ highest courts were to make use of the Protocol in a way 
which violates their EU law obligations, such a violation would be 
distinct from the EU’s own accession. It could take place any way.63 
                                                            
62. Id. at 197. 
63. See also Kokott AG, supra note 20, § 140. In fact it could well be argued that this 
issue, which is not a consequence of accession, was not within the CJEU's jurisdiction in the 
framework of the request for an Opinion. 
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But the Court does not confine itself to the above general 
concern. It points out that, post accession, the use of Protocol 16 may 
trigger the procedure for prior involvement of the CJEU, which the 
Accession Agreement sets up. That procedure, which is further 
analysed below, has been inserted into the Accession Agreement upon 
the strong insistence of the Court itself. Yet the Court considers that, 
if a Protocol 16 request to the ECtHR for an advisory opinion were to 
trigger its own involvement, because the request raises questions of 
EU law compatibility with the Convention, this would amount to the 
circumvention of the EU preliminary rulings system.64 
There are lots of “ifs” here, and I confess that I fail to understand 
the issue. The main purpose of the obligation imposed on highest 
courts to refer EU law cases to the CJEU is to ensure that EU law is 
uniformly interpreted and applied in each Member State. To achieve 
that purpose the CJEU needs to be involved. So if a national court 
refers a case to the ECtHR, instead of to the CJEU, yet the CJEU is 
nevertheless involved through the prior involvement procedure, that 
purpose would seem to be achieved. It would of course be preferable 
for that complex game of ping pong between European courts not to 
take place. But the Court’s desire expressly to ban it in the Accession 
Agreement presupposes that Member States’ highest courts cannot be 
trusted to respect EU law. That is not a position, which is conducive 
to genuine judicial dialogue. 
D. The Court’s Exclusive Jurisdiction 
The potential effect of Protocol 16 on the preliminary rulings 
system is not the Court's only concern about its own jurisdiction. In 
fact, most of the objections, which the Court sets out in the Opinion 
are linked to that jurisdiction, broadly conceived.65 In itself there is 
nothing wrong with requiring that the fundamental characteristics of a 
supreme court’s jurisdiction are preserved, as part of the autonomy of 
a legal system and as a precondition for a proper judicial dialogue. It 
is however doubtful, to say the least, whether the CJEU’s concerns 
are truly fundamental. 
In the next section of the Opinion the Court examines the effect 
of the Accession Agreement on its exclusive jurisdiction, as defined 
in Article 344 of the TFEU, according to which Member States 
                                                            
64. Id. § 198. 
65. See Eeckhout, supra note 16. 
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undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than 
those provided for therein. In previous case law, particularly 
Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant),66 the Court has applied that 
principle to an UNCLOS dispute, started by Ireland against the UK, 
which related to UNCLOS provisions which are within EU 
competence and which therefore have to be regarded as being a part 
of UNCLOS concluded by the EU. Like the ECHR post accession, 
UNCLOS is a mixed agreement, which has both the EU and its 
Member States as Contracting Parties. Instead of going to an 
UNCLOS tribunal, Ireland should have brought its dispute before the 
CJEU, pursuant to the little-used procedure of Article 259 of the 
TFEU. In the Opinion the Court refers to that judgment, and adds that 
the Member States’ duty to respect the Court’s jurisdiction is a 
specific expression of their more general duty of loyalty.67 The Court 
also draws attention to Article 3 of Protocol 8 EU, which expressly 
provides that the Accession Agreement must not affect Article 344 of 
the TFEU.68 
The Court then sets out its concerns. It considers that Article 33 
of the ECHR, which provides for inter–State cases, and would extend 
to the EU after accession, conflicts with Article 344 of the TFEU. 
Because the ECHR will form an integral part of EU law, “where EU 
law is at issue, the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction in any 
dispute between the Member States and between those Member States 
and the EU regarding compliance with the ECHR.”69 The negotiators 
of the Accession Agreement had sought to safeguard the Court’s 
jurisdiction in Article 5, by providing that proceedings before the 
CJEU are not to be regarded as a means of dispute settlement, which 
the ECHR Contracting Parties have agreed to forgo in accordance 
with Article 55 of the ECHR. That provision concerns the exclusion 
of means of dispute settlement other than those in the Convention. 
The CJEU considers that Article 5 of the Accession Agreement: 
 . . . . merely reduces the scope of the obligation laid down by Art 
55 of the ECHR, but still allows for the possibility that the EU or 
Member States might submit an application to the ECtHR, under 
Art 33 of the ECHR, concerning an alleged violation thereof by a 
                                                            
66. Comm’n v. Ireland (MOX Plant), supra note 18. 
67. See TEU supra note 58, art. 4(3). 
68. ECHR Accession, supra note 17, ¶ 201–03. 
69. Id. ¶ 204. 
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Member State or the EU, respectively, in conjunction with EU 
law.70  
The very existence of such a possibility undermines Article 344 
of the TFEU, particularly since, if an intra–EU dispute were brought 
pursuant to Article 33 of the ECHR, the ECtHR would find itself 
seised of such a dispute. Article 344 of the TFEU precludes any prior 
or subsequent external control. The above possibility “goes against 
the very nature of EU law, which . . . requires that relations between 
the Member States be governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law 
so requires, of any other law.”71 The Court concludes that “only the 
express exclusion of the ECtHR's jurisdiction under Article 33 of the 
ECHR over disputes between Member States or between Member 
States and the EU in relation to the application of the ECHR within 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law would be compatible with 
Article 344 TFEU.”72 This is another instance of a wide notion of 
conflict: one in which a proscriptive norm of EU law (Member States 
are subject to the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction) conflicts with a 
permissive norm of ECHR law (the ECHR would still allow intra–EU 
conflicts to be brought before the ECtHR). Clearly, Advocate General 
Kokott did not adopt such a wide notion, and therefore did not find 
that this aspect of the Accession Agreement is incompatible with the 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.73 
The CJEU’s analysis calls for several comments.74 It should be 
conceded that the Court’s initial starting–point is correct: once the 
ECHR forms an integral part of EU law, disputes between Member 
States, or Member States and the EU, for example on whether the EU 
complies with the Convention, are subject to the Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction. Member States ought not to take these disputes to the 
ECtHR, and they are no doubt aware of that EU law obligation, after 
the Mox Plant judgment. However, there is one type of potential 
“intra–EU” dispute, which is not subject to the CJEU’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, because it is not within its jurisdiction at all. That is the 
case for a dispute in which a Member State considers that a provision 
of EU primary law violates the Convention. The CJEU’s jurisdiction 
                                                            
70. Id. ¶ 207. 
71. Id. ¶ 212. 
72. Id. ¶ 213. 
73. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Opinion 2/13 [2014] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 107–20 
(delivered Jun. 13, 2014).  
74. See Johansen, supra note 19. 
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does not of course extend to a review of primary law, i.e., the Treaties 
and other instruments with equal status. 
It is clearly open to debate whether it would be desirable for a 
Member State to involve the ECtHR in a review of whether EU 
primary law violates the Convention. The judicialisation, through the 
use of an external control organ such as the ECtHR, of what could be 
fundamental political or constitutional EU issues may not be 
appropriate except in very specific cases. Yet in effect the ECtHR has 
already assumed that role, in the Matthews case, in which it decided 
that the citizens of Gibraltar should be able to vote in European 
Parliament elections.75 That ruling did not cause a major crisis, and 
the CJEU embraced it in Spain v United Kingdom, a judgment which 
is a good example of useful and proper judicial dialogue leading to a 
better protection of fundamental rights.76 The Matthews litigation also 
shows that, even prior to accession, EU primary law can be reviewed 
in the context of individual applications. Nor can it be argued that EU 
accession is premised on the principle that EU primary law ought to 
be immune from Convention review. The negotiations on the co–
respondent mechanism expressly took into account the possibility of 
such review.77 
It is true that ECtHR review of EU primary law could be 
employed as a form of external control of the CJEU case law. That is 
so because the line between a clear primary law violation, and one 
which is actually the result of the CJEU’s interpretation of such 
primary law, may be difficult to draw. It is easy to think of an 
example: the Court’s restrictive interpretation of the conditions under 
which private parties may bring an action for annulment, pursuant to 
Article 263 of the TFEU, has long been debated and criticised.78 
However, from the perspective of the ECtHR’s external control 
function, which is to ensure that the EU respects human rights, it is 
hard to see in what sense this kind of review would be more 
problematic than review of EU legislation, or of the CJEU’s rulings 
applying such legislation. Furthermore, the Opinion itself identifies a 
problematic principle of EU primary law: the exclusion of the CJEU’s 
                                                            
75. Matthews v. United Kingdom, pp. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58910. 
76. Spain v. United Kingdom, Case C–145/04, [2006] E.C.R. I–7961. 
77. See art. 3(3) Accession Agreement. 
78. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 
502–10 (5th ed., 2011). 
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jurisdiction over Common Foreign and Security Policy (“CFSP”) 
matters.79 It is not difficult to see how Strasbourg review of this 
exclusion, which may well be a breach of the right to an effective 
remedy,80 could be in the CJEU’s interest. Such a review could create 
pressure to extend the CJEU’s jurisdiction, or could be used by the 
CJEU as a reason for an expansive interpretation of the exception to 
that exclusion, which concerns “restrictive measures against natural 
or legal persons.”81 
How about Article 33 ECHR cases which do not involve EU 
primary law? The CJEU is right that EU Member States (or indeed 
the EU itself) could make use of Article 33 in such a way as to 
interfere with its exclusive jurisdiction. It is however questionable 
whether the Accession Agreement should seek to preclude the use of 
Article 33 altogether. First, there is the above point that the CJEU’s 
exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to the review of EU primary 
law. It is therefore difficult to see on what basis there should be a 
complete ban on “intra–EU” disputes. Second, a ban would 
presumably need to be limited to intra–EU disputes which concern 
EU law. Disputes between EU Member States which do not concern 
EU law should continue to be within the Article 33 remit. Otherwise, 
the principle that all ECHR Contracting Parties are equal would be 
breached in a way which cannot be justified on the ground of 
preserving the specificities of EU law. However, that distinction 
would mean that the ECtHR would need to decide, in the case of a 
ban, whether an Article 33 dispute between two EU Member States is 
concerned with EU law, or not. As will be discussed below, the CJEU 
considers that the ECtHR ought not to be able to look into EU law, in 
particular as regards the division of competences between the EU and 
its Member States, and as regards attribution of responsibility. But a 
review of whether an Article 33 case concerns EU law may require 
just such an examination of basic EU law principles. Third, the Court 
by speaking about “any prior or subsequent external control” is 
seeking a general ban, which also excludes a further ECtHR review 
once the CJEU has exercised its exclusive jurisdiction. From the 
perspective of the ECtHR’s control function, which is the central aim 
of the accession project, it is hard to see why an Article 33 “intra–
                                                            
79. See infra Part II.G (discussing judicial review in CFSP matters). 
80. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Opinion 2/13 [2014] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 82 
(delivered Jun. 13, 2014). 
81. See TFEU, infra note 84, art. 275.  
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EU” case ought to be excluded, if the dispute has first been dealt with 
by the CJEU. At any rate, such a potential case, which may presumed 
to be rare in practice, would raise questions about the compatibility of 
EU law with the Convention over which the ECtHR has jurisdiction 
any way, in the context of individual applications. Take the Matthews 
facts. With a view to implementing that judgment, the United 
Kingdom enabled the citizens of Gibraltar to vote in EP elections. 
Spain subsequently challenged that UK act as being contrary to EU 
law, but the CJEU rejected that challenge. Assume, for the sake of 
argument, that the Court had not done so, and had ruled that the 
United Kingdom had breached EU law, and that the new voting rights 
were unlawful. In a scenario post accession, under the arrangements 
of the current Accession Agreement which does not preclude an EU 
Member State from making use of Article 33 ECHR, the United 
Kingdom might consider bringing a case against the EU. However, 
even if it was precluded from doing so, the issue would most likely be 
brought before the ECtHR anyway, pursuant to a new individual 
complaint, brought by Ms. Matthews or by any other Gibraltar 
citizen. Lastly, even in the absence of EU accession to the 
Convention, EU Member States could make use of Article 33 ECHR 
in a case involving EU law, and there is currently no limitation to 
Article 55 of the ECHR: does that mean that their current membership 
of the ECHR is in breach of EU law? 
At a more general level, the CJEU’s analysis of its exclusive 
jurisdiction appears to seek a carve–out of parts of EU law, which 
ought not to be subject to ECtHR control. Similarly to the CJEU’s 
emphasis on safeguarding the mutual trust principle, the Court’s 
reiteration of the idea that “relations between the Member States be 
governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any 
other law,” seems to reflect a conception of intra–EU relations, which 
has been employed in other contexts. For example, the EU often 
includes so–called disconnection clauses in the private international 
law conventions it concludes.82 Those clauses aim to ensure that in 
intra–EU relations EU law prevails, and not the provisions of the 
Convention. Such an approach may be acceptable in a specific policy 
or legislative context. However, it is not consistent with the concept 
of EU accession to the Convention. Article 6(2) of the TEU requires 
such accession, and its provisions, together with those of Protocol 8, 
                                                            
82. See M. Cremona, Disconnection Clauses in EU Law and Practice, in MIXED 
AGREEMENTS REVISITED 160 (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010). 
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merely provide that accession “shall not affect the Union's 
competences” and “shall make provision for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and of Union law.” Those conditions do 
not justify a carve–out for intra–EU relations, in any shape or form. 
Moreover, if one stands back a little and tries to look at the 
CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction in its broader context, exclusivity 
becomes relative, and the carve–out could never work. The Court 
itself famously established, in Van Gend en Loos, that the new EU 
legal order has not only the Member States as subjects, but also their 
nationals (EU citizens).83 The Court’s jurisdiction is by no means 
exclusive when it comes to EU law disputes involving individuals. 
National courts are fully involved, even if they are subject to the 
obligation to make a reference to the CJEU in certain cases.84 The 
purpose of accession is to enable individuals to complain to the 
ECtHR about Convention violations by the EU. In fact, one would be 
forgiven to lose sight of that objective after reading Opinion 2/13, for 
the CJEU hardly even mentions that objective of strengthening the 
fundamental rights protection of real human beings. In light of this 
central purpose, which definitely precludes the conception that EU 
law applies to the exclusion of any other law (i.e., the Convention), 
does it really matter that much that the Accession Agreement does not 
expressly prohibit the EU Member States from litigating against each 
other or against the EU before the ECtHR? 
A last point in connection with the Court’s analysis of its 
exclusive jurisdiction is that it reveals that the EU’s membership of 
the WTO violates the EU Treaties. As pointed out by AG Kokott: 
[I]f the aim in the present case is to lay down an express rule on 
the inadmissibility of inter–State cases before the ECtHR and on 
the precedence of Article 344 TFEU as a prerequisite for the 
compatibility of the proposed accession agreement with EU 
primary law, this would implicitly mean that numerous 
international agreements which the EU has signed in the past are 
vitiated by a defect, because no such clauses are included in 
them.85 
                                                            
83. Van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62 [1963] E.C.R. 2. 
84. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[hereinafter TFEU] art. 263, 2010 O.J. C. 83, at 162 ; Foto–Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck–Ost, 
Case C–314/85 [1987] E.C.R. 4225 (national courts cannot declare EU acts invalid). 
85. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Opinion 2/13 [2014] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 117 
(delivered Jun. 13, 2014). A list of such agreements is found in Johansen, supra note 19, at 
176. 
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The Advocate General did not refer to any particular agreements, 
but at least Article 23 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding is interpreted as establishing the WTO’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to consider disputes about WTO law.86 The EU Member 
States continue to be full members of the WTO, notwithstanding the 
EU’s exclusive competence for nearly all WTO matters pursuant to 
Article 207 of the TFEU. Therefore, at least in theory, an intra–EU 
case could be brought before a WTO panel.87 However, since the 
creation of the WTO in 1995, no intra–EU cases have been brought 
before a WTO Panel, nor to my knowledge has this possibility ever 
been seriously suggested by any Member State or academic 
commentator. This perhaps shows how unlikely it is for intra–EU 
disputes on EU law issues to be brought before the ECtHR, in breach 
of the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
E. The Co–respondent Mechanism 
The Accession Agreement sets up a complex co–respondent 
mechanism in Article 3. Such a mechanism is needed because, in 
specific ECtHR cases which involve an EU law element, it may not 
always be clear whether it is the EU which is responsible for the 
alleged human rights violation, or a particular Member State which is 
implementing EU law or taking a decision connected to EU law. For 
example, a Member State may be implementing an EU directive on 
fisheries in such a way that there is a human rights violation—which 
will raise the question whether the violation results from the directive 
itself, or from the way in which the Member State has implemented 
it.88 Or, to give another example, a Member State may refuse 
authorisation for demonstrations and protests on a polluted Alpine 
motorway, with the argument that freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly need to give way to the EU free movement of goods—
which may raise the question whether EU law genuinely requires that 
restriction on these fundamental rights.89 
                                                            
86. See e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights 13, EJIL 
753, 759–61 (2002). 
87. See Halberstam, supra note 19, at 119. 
88. Cf. Joined Cases C–20, Booker Aquaculture Ltd. v. Scottish Ministers, Case 64/00 
[2003] E.C.R. I–1446. For background information, see Bruno de Witte, Beyond the Accession 
Agreement: Five Items for the European Union's Human Rights Agenda, in THE EU 
ACCESSION TO THE ECHR, supra note 47, at 349, 352–53. 
89. Cf. Schmidberger v. Republik Österreich, Case C–112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I–5694. 
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There is no need to analyse the co–respondent mechanism in 
great detail. The CJEU objects to three features of that mechanism, 
two of which are examined here.90 The first concerns the conditions 
under which a Member State, respectively the EU, may become co–
respondent.91 One avenue is for the Member State or the EU to 
request co–respondent status in a pending case. The ECtHR must then 
seek the views of all parties, and must decide upon the request on the 
basis of an assessment of the reasons given by the requesting 
Contracting Party. That assessment must establish that the reasons 
given are “plausible,” regarding the conditions for becoming a co–
respondent, set out in Article 3(2) and (3). 
The CJEU objects to the fact that the ECtHR will need to 
examine this plausibility. Its premise is that “the EU and Member 
States must remain free to assess whether the material conditions for 
applying the co–respondent mechanism are met.” This is so because 
“those conditions result, in essence, from the rules of EU law 
concerning the division of powers between the EU and its Member 
States and the criteria governing the attributability of an act or 
omission that may constitute a violation of the ECHR . . . .”92 Thus, 
the ECtHR, when deciding on plausibility, “would be required to 
assess the rules of EU law governing the division of powers . . . as 
well as the criteria for the attribution of their acts or omissions . . .”93 
This review “would be liable to interfere with the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States.”94 
The second feature of the co–respondent mechanism to which 
the Court objects concerns the consequences of the use of that 
mechanism. Article 3(7) of the Accession Agreement provides that 
the co–respondents shall be jointly responsible if the alleged violation 
of the Convention is established. However, the ECtHR may, “on the 
basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co–respondent, 
and having sought the views of the applicant, [decide] that only one 
of them be held responsible.” That is again something which the 
CJEU finds unacceptable, because it would risk adversely affecting 
the division of powers between the EU and its Member States. In 
                                                            
90. The third one concerns the position of Member States who have made use of 
reservations pursuant to art. 57 ECHR. 
91. See Accession Agreement, supra note 77, art. 3(5). 
92. Opinion 2/13, ¶¶ 220–21. 
93. Id. ¶ 224. 
94. Id. ¶ 225. 
2015] OPINION 2/13 ON EU ACCESSION 27 
response to the argument that the reasons given by the respondent and 
co–respondent (a Member State and the EU, or vice versa) will be the 
result of an agreement between them, the Court makes the following 
statements, which are worth quoting in full: 
 The question of the apportionment of responsibility must be 
resolved solely in accordance with the relevant rules of EU law 
and be subject to review, if necessary, by the Court of Justice, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that any agreement 
between co–respondent and respondent respects those rules. To 
permit the ECtHR to confirm any agreement that  may exist 
between the EU and its Member States on the sharing of 
responsibility would be tantamount to allowing it to take the 
place of the Court of Justice in order to settle a question that falls 
within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction.95 
These CJEU concerns, strongly expressed, are again highly 
problematic from the perspective of allowing for a proper judicial 
dialogue, post accession, between the ECtHR and the CJEU. They are 
not conducive to guaranteeing that the ECtHR may properly exercise 
its external control function. They are based on a misunderstanding of 
what international responsibility involves. And there is a high risk 
that any arrangements which comply with the conditions which the 
CJEU imposes will affect the position of victims of human rights 
violations for which the EU and a Member State are jointly 
responsible. 
The CJEU appears to reject that the ECtHR should be able to 
make any statements at all concerning the division of powers between 
the EU and its Member States. However, that division is a central 
feature of the EU law system, which can hardly be avoided in 
disputes, which raise questions as to the respective roles of the EU 
and of a Member State. For the ECtHR to be in a position to exercise 
its external control function, and to ensure that human rights 
violations are properly assessed and redressed, it will need to look 
into EU law, including the basic principles concerning the division of 
powers.96 That does not mean that the ECtHR can determine that 
division. It will need to ensure that, like in past cases involving State 
Contracting Parties, it assesses EU law as objectively and faithfully as 
possible. If it gets EU law wrong, that is deplorable, but a ECtHR 
judgment will of course not be capable of modifying EU law. The 
                                                            
95. Id. ¶ 234. 
96. Lazowski & Wessel, supra note 19, at 199. 
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ultimate authority for the interpretation of EU law rests with the 
CJEU, and the provisions of the Accession Agreement do not purport 
to undermine that authority, nor could they have that effect. However, 
if the ECtHR were too restricted in its power to look into EU law, as a 
result of modifications to the Accession Agreement required by the 
Opinion, the consequences are likely to be negative all round. In some 
cases it may become more difficult for a victim to obtain redress, 
because joint responsibility leaves undecided which Contracting Party 
needs to act. The actual assessment of whether there is a human rights 
violation may suffer from the fact that the ECtHR cannot look into 
EU law, which will be negative also for the EU and for EU law. 
Moreover, the CJEU confuses attribution of international 
responsibility with the EU internal division of powers.97 The former is 
built on the attribution of a breach98—in the ECHR case to either the 
EU, a Member State, or both the EU and a Member State. That 
attribution focuses on acts or omissions, not on questions of 
competence. For purposes of international human rights protection, it 
does not matter whether a municipal authority was legally competent 
under its municipal law; what matters is how it has acted, and what 
effects these acts have had on the victim of a violation. 
Take the example of the M.S.S. case regarding the return of the 
asylum seekers to Greece, pursuant to EU asylum legislation, and the 
ECtHR’s ruling that this constituted a violation of the Convention, in 
light of the deficiencies in Greece's arrangements for the reception 
and treatment of asylum seekers.99 If a similar case were to be brought 
before the ECtHR post accession, it would, of course, raise a question 
of responsibility: was Belgium required under EU law to return the 
asylum seekers, or did it have discretion, which it could exercise in a 
Convention–compatible way? The answer to that question does not 
require an analysis of the EU division of competences. It does, 
however, require an interpretation of relevant EU legislation. 
Obviously, it is in everyone’s interest—the individual’s, Belgium’s, 
the EU’s, and all other EU Member States’ interests—that the ECtHR 
adopts the right interpretation, for the purpose of determining 
                                                            
97. Regarding this distinction in the context of WTO membership, see Piet Eeckhout, 
The EU and its Member States in the WTO – Issues of Responsibility, in REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 449 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino, eds., 
2006). 
98. See the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States, and of International 
Organizations. 
99. See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.(2011). 
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responsibility. All parties need to know where they now stand. It may 
be that the point has not yet been decided by the CJEU. However, the 
Accession Agreement contains a dedicated procedure of CJEU prior 
involvement, which is designed to enable the CJEU to decide these 
kinds of issues in ECtHR cases involving EU law.100 
The idea that the ECtHR would need to look into the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States in a genuinely 
intrusive way is puzzling. Imagine that a Member State has acted in 
breach of EU exclusive competence, for example, in the field of 
fisheries. Imagine further that this action violates the right to property 
of fishermen. For the purpose of attributing responsibility under the 
Convention, the EU’s exclusive competence would be immaterial. It 
is the Member State which has acted and which is responsible. The 
Member State must remove the act and remedy the violation. It is, in 
fact, also required to do so by virtue of EU law, as there is a breach of 
EU exclusive competence, but that would not be a relevant 
consideration in the ECtHR’s assessment.  
Or imagine that we are looking at an area of shared competence, 
such as an internal market, and a case involving a Member State 
adopting new plain packaging rules for tobacco, in the presence of an 
EU Directive which is rather unclear about whether EU law allows 
this or not.101 Imagine that the ECtHR needs to examine a complaint 
to the effect that these new rules constitute a violation of the freedom 
of expression, or of the right to property. The Strasbourg Court would 
not need to look into questions of competence here. At most, it would 
need to determine whether the Member State was compelled by EU 
law, by the Directive, to adopt these rules or not. If the Member State 
was acting within its discretion, pursuant to EU law, it will be 
responsible. If EU law forced it to adopt plain packaging, the EU will 
be responsible. The prior involvement procedure can be triggered to 
allow the CJEU to decide this point. Moreover, these kinds of 
questions are already within the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, by virtue of the 
Bosphorus equivalence principle: the Court already decides whether a 
Member State has discretion under EU law or not. 
                                                            
100. See infra Part III (discussing the CJEU’s prior involvement procedure). 
101. This case is not hypothetical. The United Kingdom is currently in the process of 
adopting plain packaging rules, which are likely to be challenged as a violation of Directive 
2014/40. See Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related 
products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC, 2014 OJ L. 127/1. 
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In fact, it can be argued that the current Accession Agreement is 
too restrictive regarding the role that the ECtHR is able to play in 
determining responsibility in mixed cases where it is unclear whether 
it is the Member State or the EU which is responsible. No student of 
EU law will deny that the borders between EU and national law are 
often uncertain. That uncertainty should not however undermine the 
need to respect Convention rights and freedoms. Instead of precluding 
the ECtHR from entering those borderlands, the EU and the CJEU 
should encourage a proper dialogue with the ECtHR of precisely 
where the borders may lie in specific cases. The concept, also 
defended by Halberstam, that from an EU law perspective questions 
of responsibility for a breach of the ECHR are pure questions of EU 
law, and that the signature of the Accession Agreement would involve 
“signing away the CJEU’s power to determine what the law of the 
Union is,”102 is incompatible with the very purpose of accession and 
external control. 
The succinctness with which the CJEU in this section of the 
Opinion conflates the international law of responsibility with EU law 
principles concerning the divisions of competences between the EU 
and its Member States is wholly inadequate. The reader is left with 
the impression that it is EU law that would determine whether the EU 
or a Member State is internationally responsible. That of course 
cannot be the case. There has been intense debate, at the occasion of 
the drafting of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organisations (“DARIO”), about the extent to which EU law 
principles regarding the division of competences may play a role in 
the determination of international responsibility.103 The EU 
Commission has been arguing for there to be such a role, particularly 
in fields where the EU has exclusive competence. The ILC has 
provided some room for this position by inserting Article 64 on lex 
specialis, which provides that responsibility may be governed by 
special rules, which “may be contained in the rules of the organisation 
applicable to the relations between an international organisation and 
its members.” The commentary to that provision refers to the 
                                                            
102. See Halberstam, supra note 19, at 117. 
103. See, e.g., JEAN D'ASPREMONT, A EUROPEAN LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY? THE ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND THE EU, IN THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki Kosta ed., 
2014), at 75 ; see also ARMAN SARVARIAN, THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR AND THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, IN THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki Kosta 
ed., 2014), at 87.  
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Commission’s position, and to ECtHR case law such as Bosphorus.104 
This is a noncommittal acknowledgement, and the ILC Rapporteur, 
current Judge Gaja (“ICJ”) has stated that questions of ECHR 
responsibility will only rarely require an analysis of EU competence: 
“The question is not about who is competent, but whether the 
provision of EU law is actually at the origin of the breach.”105 For the 
CJEU to gloss over this debate and assume that responsibility and 
division of competences are one and the same is not an example of 
proper judicial reasoning.  
F. The CJEU Prior Involvement Procedure 
Article 3(6) of the Accession Agreement introduces a procedure 
of prior involvement of the CJEU in those cases which are brought 
before the ECtHR and which involve a provision of EU law that has 
not yet been assessed by the CJEU for its compatibility with the 
Convention. The procedure has been created at the CJEU’s own 
insistence.106 The CJEU was concerned that a case on EU law may 
arrive in Strasbourg, without national courts having made a reference 
to the CJEU. That this is not illusory is shown by the M.S.S. case.107 
That case concerned Belgium’s action to return an asylum seeker to 
Greece, pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. Although the asylum 
seeker had brought legal proceedings in Belgium in order to resist the 
return, no Belgian court had made a reference to the CJEU in order to 
have the right interpretation of the Dublin Regulation established. 
Not all observers are convinced that the prior involvement 
procedure is required.108 Take again, the M.S.S. case. If it occurred 
post accession, the CJEU would have to determine whether the 
Dublin Regulation complies with the Convention, before the ECtHR 
would rule on the alleged human rights violations. It is definitely not 
                                                            
104. 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_11_2011.pdf.  
105. Giorgio Gaja, The 'Co–respondent Mechanisms' According to the Draft Agreement 
for the Accession of the EU to the ECHR, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki 
Kosta ed., 2014), at 346. 
106. See Joint Communication, supra note 10; see also Jean Paul Jacqué, The Accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 995, 1017–19 (2011). 
107. See M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.(2011). 
108. See AIDA TORRES PÉREZ, TOO MANY VOICES? THE PRIOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki 
Kosta ed., 2014).  
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unimaginable, in light of the emphasis which the Court places in 
Opinion 2/13 on the principle of mutual trust, that it would decide that 
a Member State cannot verify whether the conditions of reception and 
treatment of asylum seekers in another Member State amount to 
systemic human rights violations. Assuming that the ECtHR would 
subsequently rule in accordance with its judgment in M.S.S., the 
CJEU interpretation of the Dublin Regulation would constitute a 
violation of the Convention. What this shows is that there may be 
benefits for the CJEU in not having ruled on a point of EU law, 
before a case reaches Strasbourg, in particular as the lack of a relevant 
CJEU judgment is the responsibility of the Member State, whose 
courts have failed to refer the case to the CJEU. 
Be that as it may, the negotiators have respected the CJEU’s 
wishes, and have introduced a prior involvement procedure. It may be 
noted that that procedure was even informally agreed between the 
CJEU and the ECtHR, as it is mentioned in a joint press 
communication.109It is therefore astounding to see that the CJEU finds 
the procedure to be defective and insufficient for the purpose of 
guaranteeing its say in ECtHR cases involving EU law. 
The Court’s main concern is that, as formulated in the Accession 
Agreement, the prior involvement procedure appears to be limited to 
issues of compatibility of EU acts with the Convention, and not to 
extend to the interpretation of those acts.110 That concern is 
perplexing. It is, by definition, the compatibility of EU law with the 
Convention that may be at issue before the ECtHR. That Court cannot 
simply be asked to interpret EU law. Clearly, where a compatibility 
case is subject to the prior involvement procedure, the CJEU will first 
need to interpret the EU act, before ruling on its compatibility.111 It 
may interpret the act in such a way as to be consistent with the 
Convention. The ECtHR may disagree subsequently with such 
compatibility. Or the CJEU may find that the EU act is incompatible. 
Precisely what then the effects of that ruling are on the Strasbourg 
proceedings, and on the victim's position, is unclear at this point. 
However, the CJEU is simply mistaken in distinguishing between 
interpretation and incompatibility. 
                                                            
109. See Joint Communication, supra note 10.  
110. Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, ¶¶ 242–247.  
111. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Opinion 2/13, EC:C:2014:2475 (delivered 
Dec. 18, 2014) (considering that the notion of compatibility is “sufficiently broad to include 
questions of interpretation of EU law”).  
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G. Judicial Review in CFSP Matters 
The jurisdiction of the EU Courts in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy matters is restricted to questions of competence in 
relation to other EU policies112 and to actions for annulment of 
“restrictive measures” (sanctions) against natural or legal persons.113 
This limited jurisdiction is a feature of the intergovernmental 
character of the CFSP. The Member States, or at least a number of 
them, continue to be keen to keep the EU Courts out of this area of 
policy–making, for fear of the Court’s integrationist tendencies. In the 
accession negotiations there was some debate on whether the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR should likewise be restricted in CFSP 
matters, but in the end it was decided that there should be no carve–
outs. 
Before the CJEU, the Commission had made a strong argument 
to the effect that the limited jurisdiction of the Courts could 
nevertheless be widely construed in such a way that there would be 
effective internal EU review in all cases where this would be 
warranted from the perspective of the Convention. However, the 
Court refused to countenance such a wide interpretation. It simply 
found that “the ECtHR would be empowered to rule on the 
compatibility with the ECHR of certain acts, actions or omissions 
performed in the context of the CFSP, and notably of those whose 
legality the Court of Justice cannot, for want of jurisdiction, review in 
the light of fundamental rights.”114 This, the Court considers, would 
effectively entrust judicial review of EU acts exclusively to a non–EU 
body, which is simply not permissible, even if it is a consequence of 
the way in which the CJEU’s powers are currently structured. 115 
This is again a finding that is not conducive to proper judicial 
dialogue, and it is too strict from the perspective of allowing the 
ECtHR to exercise its normal control function. That function does not 
presuppose that there is, at all times, an effective remedy under 
national law for human rights violations. Indeed, if that were the 
premise, there would be no need for the requirement of an effective 
remedy in Article 13 ECHR. It may be that the ECtHR could be 
confronted with CFSP measures that are not subject to the jurisdiction 
                                                            
112. See TEU, supra note 58, art. 40. 
113. Id. at art. 275. 
114. Id. ¶ 254. 
115. Id. ¶ 255–57. The Court also refers to Opinion 1/09, ¶¶ 78, 80 and 89.  
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of either national courts or the EU Courts. The ECtHR could then 
expose that gap in the system of protection, which the EU would need 
to remedy. From the perspective of expanding the CJEU’s jurisdiction 
in CFSP matters, that could be a good thing. Moreover, as argued by 
Advocate General Kokott, in many cases national courts, which are 
also EU courts, will have jurisdiction over CFSP measures. They are 
able, and indeed required by Art 19(1) of the TEU, to offer judicial 
protection in the field of CFSP.116 
Nor is it correct to hold, as the CJEU does, that the ECtHR 
would effectively be entrusted with judicial review of CFSP acts. The 
purpose of accession is not to make the ECtHR rule on the lawfulness 
of EU acts, but only to establish whether the EU respects or violates 
the Convention, and to give some form of redress to victims of such 
violations. It is not within the ECtHR’s jurisdiction to carry out 
judicial review, nor is it to be feared that it would take on such a role. 
117 The argument that human–rights review is, effectively, judicial 
review can be contrasted with the CJEU’s denial of its own authority, 
in Kadi I, that it was reviewing the lawfulness of the relevant UN 
Security Council resolution.118 In issuing the denial, the CJEU 
respected the limits on its own jurisdiction, which is confined to 
reviewing the lawfulness of EU acts under EU law and does not 
extend to reviewing UN resolutions under international law. There is 
no reason to expect the ECtHR not to recognize the limits on its 
jurisdiction, subsequent to EU accession. 
Lastly, the Court's refusal to accept that the ECtHR be given 
jurisdiction to look at all EU acts, including those under the CFSP, for 
as long as the CJEU's jurisdiction in that sphere is limited, may well 
be completely ineffective. In M.S.S. the ECtHR took care to spell out 
that the Bosphorus equivalence presumption is limited to 
“[c]ommunity law in the strict sense—at the time the ‘first pillar’ of 
European Union law.”119 On the ground, the CFSP is mostly 
implemented by the EU Member States, for example where the use of 
force is involved. The ECtHR may well consider that, if there was 
ever an allegation of breach of the Convention in the context of the 
                                                            
116. Id. ¶¶ 95–102. 
117. Id. ¶ 122; see also, Christiaan Timmermans, Some Personal Comments on the 
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461.  
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CFSP, the relevant Member States are fully responsible and cannot 
hide behind their EU law obligations. This scenario is worse for the 
EU than a review post accession, because the EU cannot participate in 
the ECtHR proceedings to defend itself. 
III. THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE? 
It is clear that the conditions, which the CJEU imposes in 
Opinion 2/13 are difficult to meet, both in legal and political terms. 
The Opinion reveals a fundamental disagreement between the CJEU 
and the EU Member States as authors of the Lisbon Treaty, regarding 
the desirability of EU accession to the Convention. It is difficult to 
read the Opinion in any other way. Leaving aside the question of who 
the Herren der Verträge (Masters of the Treaties) really are, the 
present critique of the Opinion should also look, generally, at the case 
in defense of the Court’s disagreement, which favours the status quo. 
Opinion 2/13 confirms a pluralist conception of the relationship 
between EU law and the ECHR. On the pluralism spectrum it is a 
conception that is closer to radical pluralism than to the softer 
versions of constitutional pluralism. The Court emphasises its 
exclusive jurisdiction in EU law, and does not accept the kind of 
interference with EU law that the Accession Agreement would entail 
by allowing the ECtHR to look into matters of EU law. It emphasises 
the autonomy of EU law, confirming its own position as the ultimate 
and, at least formally, unfettered authority on all EU law matters. It 
insists on having the last word. The protection of fundamental rights 
is a central pillar of the EU law edifice, and the CJEU cannot accept 
that in such a core area of EU law it is formally and fully bound by 
ECtHR case law, and therefore subservient to a non–EU court. 
To be fair, such a pluralist conception does not preclude judicial 
dialogue of a less formal kind. The CJEU and the ECtHR have for a 
long time communicated effectively. Nor does this conception 
preclude respect for the Convention. Its norms are part of the EU 
Charter, and there are no indications that the CJEU is aiming to 
construe the Charter in ways that fundamentally conflict with the 
Convention. Is a horizontal relationship between the two courts not to 
be preferred? 
The Accession Agreement, its academic commentary,120 and the 
complexities which Opinion 2/13 reveal, all show that EU accession 
                                                            
120. See e.g., THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki Kosta ed., 2014).  
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is likely to have a dark side. The need to arrange for co–responsibility 
and for CJEU prior involvement give rise to complex legal questions, 
the resolution of which may be the playground of specialist judges, 
counsel, and academics, but which do not in the end contribute much 
to effective and better protection of human rights in the EU. However, 
this kind of case in defence of the status quo, quickly sketched, is 
unsustainable, for reasons connected with the relationship between 
the CJEU and the ECtHR, the role and function of the ECHR, with 
the nature of the European legal space. 
After Opinion 2/13 the relationship between the CJEU and the 
ECtHR is unlikely to return to the past golden years of mutual respect 
and cooperation, let alone admiration. It will be difficult for 
Strasbourg not to look at the Opinion as a rejection of its core judicial 
function: to serve as an external control organ for human rights 
violations in Europe. It will also be difficult for the CJEU not to travel 
further along the path of developing its own, autonomous system of 
human rights protection, focused on the Charter rather than the 
Convention. Some commentators draw an analogy with how 
constitutional and supreme courts in some EU Member States deal 
with the effects of Strasbourg case law: as an obligation to do no 
more than to “take account” of that case law.121 The CJEU would 
continue to take the ECtHR judgments into account when interpreting 
corresponding Charter provisions, as indeed it did in judgments 
delivered on the same date as Opinion 2/13.122 However, even if that 
were the case, the general constellation is very different. The EU 
Member States are all formally bound by the Convention, and are 
therefore under an international law obligation to comply with the 
ECtHR’s rulings. Against such a background of international 
obligation, there may be good reasons for leaving some space for 
judicial debate by rejecting slavish incorporation of ECtHR case 
law—even if it involves threading a fine line between constructive 
dialogue and respect for the Convention. But the EU is not bound by 
the Convention, and the ECtHR cannot issue judgments against the 
EU. That is a fundamentally different stage on which the two courts 
interact. A mere “taking account” of ECtHR case law by the CJEU 
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will effectively send the message that, in the sphere of human rights 
protection, the two courts are equal, and that the Convention and the 
Charter are equivalent documents. Coupled with the expansion of EU 
law, and with its claims to supremacy and direct effect, this equality 
message risks being read as undermining the ECtHR’s core judicial 
function.  
The geo–political context of an increasingly divided Europe 
must also be taken into account.123 It would be unfortunate for the 
Opinion and the EU’s non–accession to contribute to a general split in 
conceptions of human rights protection across the European 
continent. 
The ECtHR may well react by reconsidering the Bosphorus 
equivalence presumption, at least in certain cases. The case law in the 
field of asylum discussed above, already demonstrates Strasbourg's 
ability to deliver rulings involving EU law. The Court is unlikely to 
stand back, after Opinion 2/13, particularly as regards sensitive AFSJ 
issues. It may find willing interlocutors in national supreme and 
constitutional courts, which are equally critical of some of the EU 
policy instruments in this field. The CJEU may be able to ignore 
conflicts with the ECtHR, but it cannot do so where there is a 
coalition with national courts, which may give precedence to the 
Convention over EU law.124 Such a coalition would be an existential 
challenge for EU law.125 
From a theoretical perspective, the radical pluralism paradigm 
risks undermining the very authority of law in the European legal 
space. It is one thing to conceive of European legal orders or 
systems—national law, EU law, and Convention law—as having their 
own identity and autonomy. It is another to conceive of them as self–
contained and unbridgeable. The territorial and personal space in 
which they operate is unitary. These legal systems may all claim 
authority over a single case: the case for example of the Afghan Mr. 
M.S.S. who resisted his return from Belgium to Greece for the 
purpose of examining his asylum application. If the answer to his 
claims depends on which set of norms is applied, and which court 
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hears his case, the rule of law will become relative and contingent, 
and the very idea of inalienable human rights will suffer. 
CONCLUSION 
The CJEU’s objections to the Accession Agreement do not 
persuade, and are not in accordance with, the limited conditions 
imposed by Article 6(2) of the TEU and by Protocol 8. The Accession 
Agreement does not affect the EU’s competences, and takes care to 
preserve the specific characteristics of the EU and of EU law. The 
CJEU’s wide notion of conflict is inappropriate as a benchmark for 
the kind of constitutionality review that the Court was asked to 
perform. The drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon made the fundamental 
decision that the EU’s accession is required and is in the EU’s 
interest. The wide notion of conflict, which the CJEU employs in the 
Opinion, leads to conditions for accession, which carve out certain 
areas and principles of EU law. That is not what the Treaty drafters 
intended. Nor is the CJEU right in insisting that the ECtHR should 
not be given the opportunity to look into matters of EU law—even 
matters of EU competence. The ECtHR cannot properly exercise its 
control function if it is unable to consider the relationship between 
EU law and national law, and it is as much in the EU’s interest as in 
that of the ECtHR and of the victims of human rights violations, for 
Strasbourg to be able to do so. That is not equivalent to the ECtHR 
having the last word as regards the division of competences. 
Opinion 2/13 is based on a concept of the autonomy of EU law 
that borders on autarky. The conditions the Opinion imposes on 
accession—which may not even be exhaustive—stand in the way of a 
future relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR to open up 
space for a genuine dialogue. It is clear that the CJEU has not 
digested the idea of external control, and sees it as a threat rather than 
an opportunity. In theoretical terms, it has opted for a version of 
radical legal pluralism, which enables it to confirm its supreme 
authority, unhindered by the integration of the Convention system. 
Whilst there are clearly difficulties and disadvantages associated with 
a formalised relationship between the two European courts, the 
conversion of EU law into a Fortress Europe risks becoming self–
destructive. There is, in this respect, not only the relationship with the 
ECtHR or other international courts and tribunals, but also, much 
more vitally, with national constitutional and supreme courts. 
